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NOTE
Local Regulation of SST Flights
in the United States
British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York,
558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
Shortly after 11 a.m., October 19, 1977, the Anglo-French Concorde
supersonic jetliner (SST) landed for the first time at John F. Kennedy Inter-
national Airport (JFK).' This flight was the culmination of over nineteen
months of court battles between the British and French operators of the SST
and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the Port Authority).'
Under international agreements between the United States, Britain and
France, the Department of Transportation (the Department) has the right
to regulate the conditions under which the SST may land in the United
States.3 On February 4, 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman
authorized a sixteen month testing period for the SST.4 During that time the
SST would be permitted to land twice a day at Dulles Airport outside
Washington, D.C., and four times a day at JFK. s These flights were to be
1. Kennedy Airport is located on the southern tip of Long Island, near New York City.
2. The Port Authority was created by statute, with commissioners chosen by the
legislatures of each state. These commissioners have full power to operate JFK. N.Y. Uncon-
sol. Laws §6631 (1972).
3. Each contracting party must approve the operating specifications of each scheduled
foreign air carrier entering that country. Convention on International Civil Aviation (The
Chicago Convention), (August 9, 1946), Art. 6, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591; Aviation
Agreement, United States - United Kingdom, July 23, 1977, 77 Dep't State Bull. 219 (Aug. 15,
1977): United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, (March 27, 1947), Art. lI(b),
61 Stat. 3445, T.I.A.S. No. 1679.
The Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, amending 49 U.S.C. §1431 (1972), provides
for the joint promulgation by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), to be ultimately controlled by the Department of Transportation. See
also Department of Transportation, The Secretary's Decision on Concorde Supersonic
Transports, February 4, 1976 at 9 [hereinafter cited as the Secretary's Decision].
4. Secretary's Decision at 61. These flights would be subject to the following:
(1) No flights may be scheduled for take-off or landing except between 7 a.m. and
10 p.m. local time;
(2) The British Airways flights must originate from Heathrow Airport and the Air
France flights must originate from Charles De Gaulle Airport.
(3) The Concorde would not be allowed to fly over the United States at supersonic
speeds; and
(4) The FAA is authorized to impose such additional noise abatement procedures
as are necessary and technologically feasible to minimize the noise impact. Secretary's
Decision at 3-4.
5. Each airline, British Airways and Air France would be allotted half of this quota.
Secretary's Decision at 3.
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monitored closely by the FAA in order to measure, among other things, the
noise level generated by the planes. At the end of the testing period the
Department would either renew, expand or curtail the SST's right to land in
the United States.
6
On March 11, 1976, the Port Authority banned SST landings at JFK
pending their own study of the plane's impact - in particular to formulate a
regulation that would keep the SST from adding to the airport's existing
noise level problems.7 Six days later, British Airways and Air France,
operators of the SST, filed suit in federal district court in New York.
8 They
sought an injunction of the ban on the grounds that it violated the above in-
ternational agreements, was preempted by federal authority, was dis-
criminatory, and unduly burdened interstate and foreign commerce
9
On May 11, 1977, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the airlines, holding that the federal government, in particular Secretary
Coleman's authorization, had preempted the Port Authority's right to keep
the Concorde from landing during the sixteen month testing period.' 0 The
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, on direct appeal, held,
reversed and remanded: The federal government has not preempted the
right of airport proprietors to issue reasonable regulations on airport noise.
The district court on remand must conduct "an evidentiary hearing on the
reasonableness of the Port Authority's thirteen month ban on Concorde
landings at JFK.""1 British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York,
558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. Id. at 23.
7. On February 28, 1976, the New York State legislature voted to ban SST landings in the
state. N.Y. Times, October 18, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
The Concorde has five times the low frequency content of most subsonic jets. This compo-
nent may cause structural damage to those surrounding the aiport, and would extend to the




119.5 EPNdB 113 EPNdB 107 EPNdB
Id. at 46.
8. British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York, 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. N.Y.
1977).
9. Id. at 1217; British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York, 558 F.2d 75, 85 (2d
Cir. 1977).
10. 431 F. Supp. at 26.
11. 558 F.2d at 86.
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1. BACKGROUND
In November 1962, the British and French governments agreed to work
together on the design and development of a supersonic jetliner - the Con-
corde. The SST is the only commercial aircraft that can fly faster than the
speed of sound, 2 crossing the Atlantic in almost half the time that it takes a
747 - the next fastest commercial aircraft. The main advantage of the plane
is this speed. 3 There are, however, several disadvantages: (1) cost to build,'
4
(2) fuel consumption,' 5 (3) passenger capacity,'
6 (4) exhaust," and (5)
noise.' 8 The controversy in the instant case centers around this latter
aspect. 19
Since, 1951, the Port Authority, as proprietor of JFK,
20 has required
that all aircraft landing or taking off on a regular basis have the Authority's
permission. 2 In 1955, they developed a noise level standard of 112 EPNdB
(effective perceived noise in decibels), as a basis for this permission. This
standard has been used ever since.
22
The Port Authority maintained however, that this standard could not
be applied to the SST because the pitch complained of is a low rumble which
extends much beyond the radius affected by conventional aircraft.
2 The
Authority banned the Concorde so that it could study these noise factors at
other airports. This study would enable the Port Authority to formulate a
regulation that could account for the special noise characteristics of the
SST.
2 4
12. For background on the SST, see generally note 13 infra.
13. Secretary's Decision at 51. see Allen, Legal and Environmental Ramifications of the
Concorde. 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 433 (1976).
14. Secretary's Decision at 54.
15. Id. at 29-30.
16. Id. at 33-4.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. See note 7 supra. N. Y. Times, October 20, 1977, at 40, col. I.
19. Backers of the Concorde claim that the SST is not generally noisier than current sub-
sonic aircraft such as the 707. N.Y. Times, October 20, 1977, at 20, col- L There is general
agreement that while this is probably true for landing, SST take-offs are louder. See note 7
supra.
20. See note 2 supra.
21. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §6631.
22. Id. at §6634 (a). In March 1976, the New York legislature proposed a new standard of
108 decibels. This standard would go into effect when New Jersey enacts similar legislation.
New Jersey has not done so - perhaps because the runway at Newark Airport is not long
enough for the SST.
23. See notes 7 & 18 supra.
24. See note 7 supra, para. 2.
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II. THE LEGAL ISSUES
There were two major issues before the court in the instant case. First,
whether the federal government through Secretary Coleman's authorization
had preempted any rights the Port Authority might have had to ban the SST
from JFK. If not, the second issue became whether the ban was
"reasonable."
A. Preemption
The district court set the preemption issue up in terms of three dis-
junctive sub-issues: (1) whether the ban conflicted with federal action, (2)
whether the ban unduly burdened interstate or foreign commerce, or (3)
whether it unjustly discriminated between different categories of airport
users.2" The court determined first that there was an irreconcilable conflict
between federal and local action. This was based on a finding that Congress,
and specifically the Department, had intended to "fill the field.
'2 6
Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the local regulation must yield. 2'
The appeals court in the instant case set up a broad preemption issue
analagous to the first of the district court's sub-issues (above). The court
then requested an amicus curiae brief from the United States on this
preemption issue.2" "The Government ... denied that existing legislation
authorized the Executive under any circumstances to preempt airport
proprietors from promulgating their own noise regulations." 2 9 The court
confirmed this intent independently, citing a statement by Secretary
Coleman to the House of Representatives: "[A]n airport proprietor's im-
position of a non-discriminatory ban on supersonic transports would not be
preempted by FAA action as long as it did not constitute an unreasonable
burden on interstate and foreign commerce.''30
The question became then, whether the Authority ban was either dis-
criminatory or constituted an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign
commerce. The court in the instant case considered each of these issues un-
der its second general issue - the reasonableness of the ban.
25. "This authority of the local proprietor is subject, in addition to any overriding federal
action, to at least two further restrictions. It may not take any action that imposes an undue
burden on interstate commerce and it may not unjustly discriminate between different
categories of airport users." 431 F. Supp. at 22.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 22, 26.
28. 558 F.2d at 82.
29. Id.
30. Id.
LOCAL REGULATION OF SST FLIGHTS
B. Reasonableness.
The court prefaced its discussion of this issue with the limitation that it
could not decide the issue of reasonableness, because it had not yet been
presented in an adversary context. The analysis which followed would
presumably serve as a framework for the district court decision on remand.
The court characterized the federal regulatory scheme to prevent ex-
cessive aircraft noise, as one relying on local cooperation.' There are two
distinctions between local regulations that would be invalid and those that
would be cooperative. First, the court made a distinction between control of
airspace and regulations concerning the airport itself. The court cited
several decisions which hold that towns do not have the right to regulate
whether or at what altitudes, planes might fly over their populations,
because that task demands uniformity and is best handled by the pervasive
regulatory scheme set forth by the FAA.32 A ban would not, per se, interfere
with this regulatory scheme.
The second distinction which applies to the instant case is that between
regulations by airport proprietors, and local ordinances by non-proprietors.
The rationale for this distinction is twofold: (1) tort liability and (2)
economics. "[S]ince the operator controls the location of the facility, ac-
quires the property and air easements and is often able to insure compatible
land use, he is liable for compensable takings by low flying aircraft."33
Secondly, "it has always seemed fair to assume that the operator will act in a
rational manner in weighing the commercial benefits of proposed service
against its costs, both economic and political. '34 This responsibility of an
airport proprietor provides the Port Authority with a viable local interest.3"
The above local interest would have to be weighed against the accom-
plishment of legitimate national goals.36 The court emphasized that in this
case, those national goals concerned not only national commerce concerns,
31. Id. at 83.
32. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); American Air-
lines v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Circ. 1968); Air Transport Ass'n. v. Crotti, 389
F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In each of these cases, the court held a municipal ordinance in-
valid because it encroached on the federal regulatory scheme of air traffic control. For a general
discussion of these and other cases on the same issue, see Warren, Airport Noise Regulation:
Burbank, Aaron, and Air Transport, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 403 (1966).
33. 558 F.2d at 85. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). In that case,
the court held that an airport proprietor could be found liable for "compensable takings" from
neighboring residents where low flying aircraft generated substantial noise over their houses.
369. U.S. at 90.
34, 558 F.2d at 85.
35. Under Griggs, note 33 supra, the Port Authority remains liable to residents who can
establish that Concorde noise has either damaged their property or severly impinged on the use
of it. 46 U.S.L.W. 2175 (October 11, 1977).
36. Id.; see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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but delicate international relations centering on the economic and environ-
mental problems inherent in the Concorde.37 The opinion concluded by urg-
ing that if the ban were held reasonable, the Port Authority nevertheless
should expedite the study and fix standards as soon as possible, in the in-
terest of ending this "interminable strife.
3
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
JFK was opened to Concorde testing.3 9 On August 17, 1977, the district
court on remand held that the Port Authority ban could not stand because it
was an "excessive and unjustified delay" in setting noise regulations for the
SST.40 On September 29, 1977, the court of appeals affirmed, finding the
ban arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory."' On October 7th, Justice
Marshall of the Supreme Court issued a temporary stay to the appeals court
decision, on an interlocutory appeal.42 This added life to the Port Authority
ban was again ended when the Court denied the motion for a stay on Oc-
tober 17th, leaving the decision of the court of appeals to stand.,3
This result might well have been the same had the court, in this case,
simply affirmed the district court's original finding - that the Department
of Transportation preempted the Port Authority from regulating in the field
of noise control. It is important to examine the framework which the court
established in the instant case to determine whether the preemption ruling
could withstand close scrutiny on any appeal to the Supreme Court, and to
examine which framework uses a preferable test in light of policy for airport
noise regulation both at JFK and any other international airport.
The district court, by relying on the preemption doctrine, successfully
avoided the commerce clause issues which require balancing federal and
local interests, and determining whether the ban placed an undue burden on
commerce (interstate and foreign). 4 However, as the court in the instant
case reasoned, those issues must be decided because neither Secretary
Coleman nor his successor Brock Adams "filled the field" via the 1972
Noise Pollution Control ACt.45 The proprietor exception therefore applies to
this case and "reasonable" regulations are valid. 46 This conclusion is almost
37. 558 F.2d at 86.
38. Id.
39. See p. 1 supra.
40. 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
41. 46 U.S.L.W. 2175 (October 11, 1977).
42. 46 U.S.L.W. 3236 (October 11, 1977).
43. 46 U.S.L.W. 3261 (October 18, 1977).
44. 431 F.Supp. at 1216; 558 F.2d at 75; see note 40 supra; see also Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
45. See note 3 supra.
46. 558 F.2d at 82.
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inescapable, and any invalidation of the ban based on preemption alone
would probably be struck down on appeal.
The "reasonableness" test is also grounded on fair policy considera-
tions. If the federal government had the right to regulate noise control to the
exclusion of airport proprietors, this would impinge severely on fundamen-
tal proprietary rights of an airport operator to develop land facilities in a
manner which coincides with its responsibility to neighboring residents.47
The subsequent finding by the district court that the Port Authority ban was
arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable does not mean that the Port
Authority can never keep the Concorde from landing - only that the
Authority must formulate a regulation that can screen any plane in terms of
the specific noise complaints which the Concorde generates. The regulation
must do so without placing an undue burden on interstate or foreign com-
merce.
While the test theoretically provides for the possibility of reasonable
regulation, the task at present seems gargantuan. The Concorde's trial runs
at JFK have satisfied existing noise regulations. 48 Moreover, the SST is
already an economic burden to its backers. 49 In assessing Port Authority
regulations under the above test, any benefits to JFK neighbors must be
weighed against additional economic losses which backers of the SST might
suffer as a result of further restrictions or requirements.50
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
There is no international legal duty - either by treaty or custom - for
the United States to admit the Concorde or deny its entrance.5' That final
decision would be based on balancing competing policy interests. 52 The
testing program would give the Department a clearer understanding of the
plane's environmental impact when balancing these interests."
"The Concorde represents a thirteen year commitment of almost three
billion dollars by the British and French governments who are among our
closest allies and our best customers of United States goods. Prestige,
47. See note 33 supra.
48. 437 F. Supp, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); N.Y. Times, October 20, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
49. N.Y. Times, October 21, 1977, at 21, col. 3.
50. Secretary's Decision at 54-6.
51. Id. at 54.
52. Policy arguments in favor of the SST center on its speed, the need to improve aviation
technology and the mutual benefits derived from international economic cooperation. Argu-
ments against the plane focus on both its environmental impact - chiefly noise and exhaust,
and its inefficiency - fuel per passenger mile and cost to build. The Secretary will weigh the
above benefits against the environmental impact, leaving the SST's economic inefficiency (if
proven) to doom it in the marketplace.
53. Id. at 3-4
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economic vitality and employment stability are at stake."5 4 Aside from such
concerns for the economic success of their own airlines, the British and
French hope that by establishing the economic viability of the Concorde,
they can recoup substantial development costs through sales of the plane to
United States airlines."
Because the British and French have a large financial stake in United
States approval of the SST, it is in the national interest to give the Concorde
a fair evaluation." International aviation depends on reciprocity. The Un-
ited States is the largest exporter of aircraft in the world and the British and
French are a lucrative market for these planes.57 United States airlines de-
pend on reciprocal agreement on routes and schedules for flights to Britain
and France - major entries to Europe for American tourists and business
people.5" If the British and French felt that the United States had treated the
Concorde unfairly, retaliation could have a detrimental impact on these Un-
ited States concerns, if the European market for aircraft and air service were
curbed. Therefore, as the court in the instant case stated, "it is imperative
that the noise regulations, promulgated by those who, like the Port
Authority, operate our international airports, withstand all allegations of
arbitrariness or discrimination."
s 9
When the Port Authority banned the SST, that ban was discriminatory
on its face. The authorization by the Department amounted to four daily
flights subject to noise abatement restrictions,6 ° not a general clearance for
SSTs to use JFK. For purposes of solely testing environmental impact, one
airport would seem to be as good as another. However, the interest on the
part of the Department and SST operators was clearly to make the service as
economically viable as possible on this limited basis, by using JFK, a large
American gateway to Europe. The Port Authority ban severely affected the
economic success of the program, especially because there was no im-
mediate alternative facility to JFK.61 Moreover, it was not clear that the
four daily SST flights would add to existing noise level problems at JFK.
54. Id- at 21.
55. See note 49 supra.
56. Secretary's Decision at 54-6.
57. Id.
58. The Civil Aeronautics Board negotiates bilateral agreements for routes and schedules,
within the framework of the treaties cited in note 3 supra. Aviation Agreement, United States-
United Kingdom, July 23, 1977, 77 Dep't State Bull. 219 (Aug. 15, 1977)
59. 558 F.2d at 86.
60. See p. 1, and note 5 supra.
61. On September 23, 1977, Secretary of Transportation Adams proposed SST landings
at: Miami, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seat-
tie, Anchorage and Honolulu. To date none of these proposals are in effect. N.Y. Times, Oc-
tober 18, 1977, at 28, col. 2. See also note 49 supra.
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However, it is important to give local interests the right to cooperate in
decisions which affect international policies, when this cooperation is both
strictly controlled by the federal government, and squarely based on the
responsibility which local proprietors have to neighboring residents.
62 The
test which the court in this case set forth provided for this cooperation. At
the same time, the "reasonableness" test insured that in regulating SST ser-
vice, local interest would have to balance favorably against national and in-
ternational concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in the instant case was somewhat mooted by subse-
quent decisions which lifted the Port Authority ban.63 The rationale behind
that decision, however, is vital to the evaluation of any subsequent SST
regulations established by local airports. On November 22, 1977, scheduled
passenger service on the Concorde began at JFK. Under the framework of
the decision in this case, that service could again be barred if the Port
Authority were able to formulate a regulation that would bar the SST
without discriminating or unduly burdening commerce.64
A ruling based on total preemption could not have withstood close
legal analysis. Nor would it have been fair to the Port Authority as JFK's
proprietor. The federal government should not control any area for which it
is not ultimately responsible to local complainants. Because the Port
Authority can be held liable for "compensable takings" of property by air-
craft noise, the right to regulate reasonably should accompany that duty. 65
It is unlikely that JFK can bar the SST under the reasonable regula-
tions test. There are strong federal interests in giving the SST a fair evalua-
tion (if not final approval) which presently outweigh the apparent local in-
terest in keeping the SST out of JFK.66 The United States must be careful to
maintain a semblance of fairness in any decision on the Concorde because of
the financial stake which the British and French have in the plane's
acceptance in the United States. Any economic sanctions taken by those
countries against the United States would have severe economic repercus-
sions here."7 While the unique quality of SST noise may be both difficult to
62. See note 47 supra.
63. 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 46 U.S.L.W. 2175 (October 18, 1977).
64. 558 F.2d at 86; 46 U.S.L.W. 2175 (October 11, 1977).
65. See note 47 supra.
66. The fact that on February 28, 1976, the New York State Legislature voted to ban SST
landings in the state, and that New York demonstrators against the SST had been consistently
active indicates a likelihood that the March 11, 1976 ban was politically motivated. See also
note 19 supra; cf note 7 supra.
67. The United States has a further interest in showing support for economic allies in
Western Europe to combat what critics call a declining trend in Western capitalism.
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measure and pervasively destructive, 68 until these allegations can be sub-
stantiated, local interest could not weigh favorably against a strong federal
interest in allowing the Concorde to land at JFK.
TIMOTHY F. BURR*
68. The SST has had test flights into Dulles since May 24, 1976. Preliminary results do not
indicate a likelihood of destruction to personal property surrounding JFK. See 437 F. Supp.
804 (S.D.NY. 1977), 46 U.S.L.W. 2175 (October 18, 1977) N.Y. Times, October 20, 1977, at
20, Col. 1.
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